By casting Missourians as uniformly proslavery and thus by default as Southern, historians have oversimplified not only Missourians' motives and actions but also, more important, the social and ideological evolution of the very border region they occupied. Historians have interpreted Southernness through a number of lenses, including: a lingering frontier experience and the violent culture associated with it; a humid climate capable of sustaining cash crops (and thus the prevalence of slavery); a predominantly rural, agrarian population (without cities and industry); white cultural homogeneity derived largely from the absence of European immigration in the nineteenth century and the presence of a large Afi'ican American population {which produced a form of herrenvolk dertiocracy and an attendant virulent racism); a militant opposition to reform that included education; and a potent evangelical tradition that instilled a strong conservatism and resistance to change.^ Like much of the region that would come to be known as the Border South, Missouri's experience through the mid-nineteenth century embodies a number of these theories but directly contradicts others. If anything, the story of the Border (with Missouri being especially instructive) offers a window into the complex process by which the South and West became separate entities despite their shared cultural past.
While the process itself was fluid, with distinctions between Southern and Western blurring during the antebellum struggle over slavery's expansion, for residents of the Border region (described aptly in 1861 by one Northern observer as "North of South"), Southernness was itself only the end product of a complicated process driven less by culture than by the politics surrounding the institution of slavery. Ironically, the competing definitions of democracy in the West-and slavery's place within them-that rent the nation and sent tremors across the West's political landscape precipitated in large sections of Missouri a transformation of its residents' collective identity from one predominantly Western to self-consciously Southern. For Missourians especially, the Kansas conflict was a cardinal component of the process through which this identity shifted. Through Kansas, itself a capstone of the national struggle over slavery's extension into the West, Missourians tied sympathetic strands (including conceptions of slavery, the federal government, and the West itself) that had bound them loosely to the South into a new political identity. Though Northerners first characterized slaveholding Missourians as Southerners {an appeUarion they inirially resisted), the Kansas experience caused many white Missourians to move from being Southern sympathizers to being avowed Southerners, '' Through the mid-nineteenth century, white Missourians wore their Westemness on their proverbial sleeves. The combination of the lure of the frontier, the fireedom of movement in the vast domain, the exertion of independence fi-om family and other forms of authority, perceived economic opportunities in the form of land, and the intoxication of conquest hadfor generations given frontier settlers, whether fi-om the low country into the piedmont, fiom the Massachusetts Bay to the Narragansett country, or fi-om the Chesapeake across the mountains into the Bluegrass, a source of pride in being Westerners. In the era of Jacksonian ascendance, the West represented the bastion of democracy. In this new Eden, away from the corruptive influence of society, the free individual exercise of "natural rights" offered those who migrated the chance to moid a society in which people could govern themselves with the least possible hindrance. With classic liberal thought, these new pioneers believed that an individual was more important than any institution, especially government. Personal liberty-the West's staff of life-involved an inherent intolerance or, at best distrust of governmental or other intrusion. As much as any other regional group, these Westerners suffered the Lockean conundrum of supporting limited government to protect individual rights while considering governmental power the greatest threat to those rights. Such logic moved Howard County, Missouri, politico Duff Green in 1819 to offer a hiring toast just as he called for an unrestricted statehood for Missouri: "The Union-It is dear to us, but liberty is dearer."Ŷ et these Westerners' concept of democracy proved inherently undemocratic. As "rugged individualists" defined liberty according to the exigencies of their lives in the Ear West, theirs was a democracy of opportunity, devoted to the principle of firee access to the means of advancement, rather than to its actual achievement. In /MwjiJun,vol,3,iS2oiojSöo(Columbia:tJniv, Of MissoanPTess,i972),6; BJchäTdA.&iit\ett,TbeNewCountry: Asocial Historj'of the American Frontier, 1776-1S90 (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1974) Knopf, 1990), 63, eahty. of course, not all were equal, and no democracy existed in truth, yet the illusion of accompLshment, quite apart from any achievement of actual success, fortified their notions of independence. This Western philosophy was thus a peculiar hybrid: at once individualistic, democratic, and egalitarian while innately traditional, hierarchical, and conservative. One Missourian attributed tbis distinct brand of Western democracy to "the mixed nature of our population... consistbg of individuals thrown together-from various quarters, possessing more than an ordinary spirit of intelligence and enterprise, bent upon personal aggrandizement, in tbe pursuit of wealth or fame or ready (witb some bonorable exceptions) according to the Western phrase, to take all advantages."M any Missourians firmly rooted their opportunistic support for their region's democratic promise in conrinued governmental support for frontier slaveholding. These residents, as opposed to tbeir counterparts in the upper Middle West (who moved there from regions now largely devoid of chattel bondage), saw slavery as perfectly consistent witb or even essential to frontier development. Slave labor offered a distinct advantage to those who sought to tame the wilderness for economic benefit. While not all possessed slaves, the prevailing theory held that with diligence, thrift, and sagacity anyone could obtain them. Individuals who obtained slaves initiated progress-for themselves and society-as much as any Northern free-labor ideologues. The democracy thus envisioned by these Westerners in effect justified inequality based upon slaveholding. If anything, this oppression offered the opportunity to establish their supremacy in the leveled atmosphere of democratic egalitarianism. Despite Alexis de Tocqueville's claim that slavery was simply out of step witb American democratic notions and tbat tbe westward march of progress would ultimately cause it to collapse from its incompatibility witb democratic principles, miUions of Westerners most decidedly did not reject slavery as incongruent with democratic ascendance. Rather, they embraced the institution as perfectly consistent with the egaÜtarian social progress they associated implicitly with the promise of Western expansion.a Wbile their culture might have derived largely from a slaveholding heritage sectionalized to the extent that in common parlance their institution was "peculiar" to the South, Missourians still considered themselves and their state part of the West. More specifically, during the sectional era, they considered themselves (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1970). 11-39. part of the Middle West-"the heart of the American continent." as one put it. Embodied in town names such as Westport, Weston, and even tbe German Americans' Westphalia, tbis conscious regional identity was articulated best by James S. Rollins, a Boone County proslavery politico, who cautioned bis son, a cadet at West Point, to "say to tbe Northern and Southern cadets-that you belong to neither section-th&t you are a true son of the great West." SemanticaUy, rural Missourianseven those in the Boon's Lick, the Missouri River counties that formed the state's slaveholding heart-regarded the South and certainly the North as distinct, even foreign, regions from their own. One proposal submitted to tbe Missouri House claimed that Missouri, "being one of tbe most north western Slave States... occupies a central portion in this grand valley of the Mississippi [whose] geographical position in this Union presents a unit in interest, whether considered commercially, socially or politically-such a unity of interest can never be permanently severeci." Even David Rice Atchison. considered Missouri's Southern rigbts champion, responded to arguments linking Missouri with the South by quickly reminding a Middle West colleague in the Senate who had differentiated his region from those practicing slavery that Missouri was indeed "one of the northwestern States, although it is generaUy, from its institutions, classed as one of the southwestem States." True to its Western identity and to its pledge to "take a just and conservative position ... and arrest the fire brands hurled by the violent and fanatical portion of the North and the South," Missouri sent no representatives to a "Southem convention" held at Nashville in 1850, though the topic of debate concemed the maintenance of slavery.T he case of Atchison illustrates the quixotic position of slavery in the state, as well as its influence on the residents' view of the state's place in the Union. Upon ascending to tbe Senate, Atcbison adopted John C. Calhoun's rhetoric, assisted in the drafting of the South Carolinian's 1849 "Southem Address," and then was the lone Missourian to sign it and actively champion its doctrines in his home state. He avowed that "as a Senator from Missouri and as a citizen of a Slave State, it is my duty to resist every attempt to change her Institutions, and every assault upon her rights" and that he "expect[ed] always to be found acting with the Southern men iit the Senate chamber and out of it, in defence of the rights of the Southern States." However fiery his words, Atchison did not adopt Calhoun's world. He was no planter in Missouri's reckoning, much less that of the plantation states, and was not even a farmer but a bachelor lawyer and circuit court judge before attaining the Senate in 1843. Son of a small slaveholding yeoman from the Bluegrass, Atchison had moved from Kentucky to far western Clay and Platte Counties, vestibules to the slaveholding Missouri River counties. Atchison quickly became a spokesman for the region's common whites and, in words and deeds he proved indistinguishable from the fireeaters of South Carolina and Mississippi in his defense of slavery. Yet one incontrovertible fact set him decidedly apart from the rabid cotton state defenders of the peculiar institution: Atchison owned at most one bondman.T hat Atchison was a small or even non-slaveowning Missourian does not suggest that he failed to embrace slavery. Indeed, he and thousands like him thought just the opposite; if anything, the comparatively small number of slaves in Missouri seemed only to magnify the institution's importance. Atchison's support of Calhoun coincided with a precipitous proportional downturn in the state's slave holdings. In 1850, slaves represented 12.8 percent of Missouris total population, down from more than 15 percent a decade before. By i860, affer waves of immigrants had poured into the state, Missouri's slaves accounted for just 9,6 percent of its residents, the smallest proportion of all slave states save Delaware, More to the point, in that year slave-owning families represented just 18,4 percent of the state's total, lowest of any of the slave states save Delaware and a far cry from South Carolina, where more than half of all free white families owned bondpeople. By i860, Missouri's 24,000-odd slaveholders constitutedjust 2.3 percent of its total free population and their families 12,5 percent of Missouri's white families."
Atchison's peculiar crusade for the peculiar institution was no mere charade to win political support among slaveholders or anyone else. That Missouri's most ardent defender of slaveholding was himself barely, if at all, the master of slaves offers a revealing insight into the complex evolution that the issue of slavery had undergone in the minds of Missourians, slaveholding and not. Despite the proportional decline of the slave population in Missouri during the final antebeUum decades, raw numbers of slaves in Missouri actuaüy increased during the same period, and tbey did so dramatically. Between 1830 and 1850, Missouri's slave population more than tripled to 87,422; by ]86o, that number had increased by another third to ii4.93J. an all-time high. More than 35,000 of these persons labored in the central river counries of the Boon's Lick. Inflated prices of slaves offered no indication that chattel bondage was waning in Missouri. Indeed, prime field hands fetched routinely as much as $1,500 m Howard County, while annual prices for hired laborers caused one resident of Prairieviile to write late in the decade that "every thing is rising in value-especially negro property-hheelings went at most exorbitant prices on New Year's day-men generally at about $230 for theyear.... Slave labor has never been any thing Uke so high."" Given the proliferation of slavery in Missouri, and with roots sunk deeply in an ideological soil of individual and democratic rights, these Westerners found it easy to construct an active response to the threat that the antislavery host posed to their peculiar institution. Armed with their battle-cry of liberty, they waged war in this new sectional realm first against William Lloyd Garrison's undemocratic abohtionists, then against all free-state antagonists in their midst (including their own Thomas Hart Benton). who they condemned as subverting democratic ascendance in the West, "It was the fixed design of tbe Free States." Atchison howled, "not only to prevent the Slave States from any further participation in the Territories of the United States, but by a series of measures to reduce the latter to a state of helpless inferiority, and to subject them and their institutions to the mercy of Abolitionism. And that Missouri would be the first victim sacrificed upon the altar of this infernal spirit." Recognizing slavery's power in Missouri's consciousness, artist George Caleb Bingham remarked astutely in 1854 that "the slavery agitation is too convenient an instrument in the hands of demagogues to be dispensed with."'-As the national debate over slavery drew the West into its scope during the agitation over Texas and the Mexican Cession, Missourians saw the controversy surrounding their own statehood thrust again into the national forum. The very boundary that marked their state's Southern border-the 36*'3o" parallel-became alternately the seed of harmony and discord between slavery's restrictionists and extensionists. As Congress debated the Kne again, this time across the vast territories acquired fTom Mexico, Missouri as a slave state was once again isolated between a northwestern region that forbade the institution and the remaining northern expanse of the Louisiana territory, where the very act that had breathed life into Missouri had barred slavery. As Missourians did all in their power to maintain their allegiance to the democratic Middle West, the nation's newest paroxysm over slavery forced them into the role of regional outsiders." Yet Missouri^ans refi:ained firom adopting the language of division emanating with increasing volume from the cotton states. Cries of disunion and secession, grown louder during the territorial debate, met with stony silence in Missouri. Claiborne E, Jackson was forced to fend off widespread attacks as a "nullifier," a once-democratic haUmark now linked to the Calhoun camp and thus condemned as being disunionist. He could not shake this charge, which cost him his seat in the Missouri senate as well as his candidacy for the U.S. House, More important, in their defense of slavery, Missourians embraced a strangely selective, even contradictory stance on federal and state power within the repubUc, one that accepted Congress's authority to legislate on slavery while accommodating the various states' rights to protect its residents' property, so long as neither interfered with individual liberties. Slaveholding was one of those liberties, "I take the ground, that neither Congress, nor even the state in convention have anything to do with slave property, anymore than any other species of property," wrote John J.Lowry, a legislator firom Eayette, "I assume that there is no such thing as absolute state sovereignty,.,, I am satisfied with the Missouri compromise, or any other compromise, if the people acquiesce in them, & they will sèment [sic] the Union of these states This is high ground,,.. but it is the orily tenable ground, which I can discover in accordance with the true rights of property,"" Seeking a middle ground in the growing struggle, Missourians espoused what Carl Degler has called a "peculiar Unionism," maintaining steadfast loyalty to the Union while supporting slavery-and as yet the democratic process-as the foundation of liberty. In 1855, Boon's Lickers called for a Union state convention for the purpose of "averting the calamities which a separation of the States would bring upon us"; a year before, residents of Weston had called a "Law and Order" meeting and declared unwavering fidelity to the government, taking as their motto "The Union first. Union second, and Union forever." Yet because of the past decade's debates, the politicized issue of slavery had become democracy's litmus, weakening the ground upon which slavery and liberty had coexisted peacefliUy.^*
In an attempt to keep their footing as slaveholders and unionists, Missourians sought to convince the nation that a fourth section of the country existed apart firom the North, South, and West-one that ameliorated tbe antagonistic influences in their daily lives and which, if recognized, could do so witb the country as a whole. They regarded the middle, or border, states as a natural alignment of culture, heritage, climate, and geography. Most important, all were slaveholding states, as much firom conviction as fi-om economy, as Atchison's case illustrates. As Senator Henry S. Geyer noted before the U,S. Senate, "south of 36"3o" is the cotton region, where Press, 1990), 6-7, slave labor may be profitably employed... Tbere, soil & climate settle tbe question; ... but in the latitude above that and below 41" is the debatable ground. Tbat is the latitude of the middle states-Virginia. Maryland, and Kentucky." Able to separate tbemselves from tbe sectional debate over slavery, the middle border states, as Geyer saw them, "should, and must, at no distant day, exercise a potent influence in gi\áng tone, character and direction to our national legislation." The concept of a middle confederacy of sorts as healer of tbe ailingnation appealed to many Missourians who felt caught in the increasingly vituperafive sectional climate. More important, the concept vindicated their place as virtuous slaveholders within the republic.^Ŷ et as tbe nation cleaved over the issue of chattel slavery, Missourians found themselves squarely in two lines of fire, one from the abohtionists who aimed at slaveholders in general and another from tbe Free Soilers who targeted slaveholding Westerners directly. Missourians heard In Northern condemnations of the institution the cant of an accepted superiority of their free society over the slave society of the South. Free labor and Free Soil advocates in Washington condemned Southern slave society as socially stagnant, without incentive and degrading to laborers, and touted the West as holding the friture greatness of America-^a vista achieved only hy the prohibition of slavery from the region. One person from the Old West, Ohioan Salmon P. Chase, held that a free West, devoid of slavery, would offer "freedom not serfdom; freeholds not tenancies; democracy not despotism; educarion not ignorance . .. progress, not stagnation or retrogression." From St. Louis, Frank Blair proclaimed boldly that "the wealth and the poHtical power of the country will in a little time reside at its Geographical centre," later noring abnost wistfully that once crossing the river into Illinois, one could not view "the splendid farms of Sangamon and Morgan, without permitting an envious sigh to escape him at the evident superiorit)' of free labor."'& More offensive to proslavery Missourians than any moral or economic denigration was that the Northern assault on slavery and the restrictionist effort intrinsically relegated slaveholders to the status of numerical inferiors. Indeed, Atchison hecamejohn C. Calhoun's Southern rights standard-bearer not from any long-standing belief in his or Missourians' general Southern heritage, but because of the specter of a Nori:hem majoritarianism. Calhoun's "Disquisition on Government"-which argued that too much iiberty in the hands of those unfit to exercise it was democracy's curse-put the matter in language unmistakable to these beleaguered Westerners. The charge of inferiority, combined with the attempt to limit slavery's extension, caused Missourians to see the Northern antislavery element as a tyrannical majority intent upon oppressing an enlightened minority. In attempting to limit the South's abilit)' to carry its property wberever it chose, the North was clearly limiting its con- stitutional freecioms. Denying slaveholders their constitutional right to property, and thus to freedom, was in effect the denial of equality, yet another proof that Eree Soilers, not slaveholders, intended to destroy democracy in the nation.i'T o Missourians, democracy had, in effect, empowered a culturally inferior yet numericafly superior people, extending them the right and the power by virtue of the mass franchise and electoral policy to claim the nation's future. The unfit in the sectional era were antislavery Northerners, especially those influencing the national government as they sought to "monopolize" the territories. Already bordered by two free states and with the prospect of a third on the west as mandated by the Missouri Compromise. Missouri appeared inevitably doomed as a slaveholding peninsula in an angry sea of free-soil Westerners. Both Atchison and Geyer grasped this portent firmly. In the debate over the organization of Nebraska, Atchison (echoing his late captain, Calhoun) vowed to "oppose the organization or the settlement of that Territory unless my constituents and the constituents of the whole South, of the slave States of the Union, could go into it upon the same footing, with equal rights and equal privileges, carrying that species of property with them as other people of this Union.... I will vote for a bill that leaves the slaveholder and nonslaveholder upon terms of equality." Geyer argued similarly: "The antagonism and hostility between the States and the people, engendered by tbe agitation of the slavery question," he charged, "is aggravated by hostile legislation and the struggle for poEtical power by a sectional party warring upon the institutions of one half the States of the Union."i9
The defense of individual white minority rights in the republic-with slavery at the notion's heart-soon drew Missourians into a general acceptance of the concept of Southern rights, which entailed defiance against the majoritarian authority. More ominously, its sympathetic and widespread use in country parlance suggested a retreat from the Middle Western identity that bad so shaped its past and a move toward a distinctive identity based upon separation-party and otherwisefrom its once-Western moorings. In the heat of the sectional debate, that identity clearly sympathized with the plight of the beleaguered South. One Democratic editor saw the need to clarify for his Boon's Lick readers the specious political nature of this newfound Southern afiiliation: "Many conscientious men both Whigs and Democrats doubted the policy of repealing the Missouri Compromise; but our idea is that aU those of every party who acquiesce in that repeat, and who are opposed to interfering with the question any longer, are good friends to... 'Southern rights,' as 
^''
Missourians found solace in the imagery of victimization embedded in the concept of Southern rights. As Congress again wrestled over slavery's extension into the Mexican Cession, Missourians-now condemned by abolitionists as moral degenerates and by Free Soilers as economic irrationalists-grew impassioned with the recollection of Northern contempt and diminution during their state's natal struggle. Clearly, as Henry S, Geyer dutifiiUy reminded his Senate colleagues, "there were some in western Missouri who remembered how little their rights were respected by the North in the memorable struggle of 1820." William B, Napton echoed these sentiments, claiming that "the injustice of the old Missouri Compromise is manifest from its very terms. It recognizes the great principle of popular sovereignty south of the line of 36"3o'-but north of that line establishes a guardianship over the people and imposes an absolute restrictloti. It is as much adverse to the spirit of our Constitution as the famous Wilmot Proviso." Anathema to egalitarianism, the North's concert of exclusion against the South quickly conjured among Missourians their ancestors' own revolutionary struggle against a t)'rannical majority. Indeed, Napton defended "the great principle of popular sovereignty, for which our ancestors in the revolution fought."^Ŷ et this new struggle did not yet signal a new revolution, at least not against the Federal government. Rather, democratic Missourians believed they must act as sentinels against a nti slavery zealots bent upon the Union's destruction. "Certainly it is not the part of a good patriot to do anything, or say anything," Napton caufioned, "by which the tendency to disunion may be hastened-and it is well enough to hold up in terrorem all the evils which fertile imagination may conceive, as to the necessary results of such an occurrence." John J. Lowry's condemnations of Benton echoed the same themes: "Col. earth, we, nevertheless, regret to hear the charge of Abolitionism and Ereesoilism applied indiscriminately to all men who do not feel disposed to threaten "blood and thunder" against every man hailing from a firee State, and especially against those who, whilst they believe that Congress has the constitutional power to legislate upon the subject of slavery in the Territories, are yet decidedly opposed to its exercise," Indeed, in 1853 Claiborne E, Jackson found himself forced to explain his understanding of the term "Eree Soiler" on the floor of the state senate, after having used the charge ubiquitously against political opponents, Jackson quickly equivocated, claiming that "he did not consider a man who believed Congress had the power to exclude slavery fi-om the Territories of the United States a free soiler; but those who advocated the exercise of the power, were free soilers."^Ŷ et as Northerners united against slavery and the slave power by adhering to the Eree Soil movement, many Missourians heard more than condemnation of the South, They heard themselves condemned first as slaveholders then, by association, as Southerners. When Erank Blair, an ardent Eree Soil Democrat who would soon take up and wave the RepubUcan banner, was elected to Congress from St. Louis in 1S56, the National Era hailed the victory as harbinger of regional, even national politics. It predicted confidently that the Border would soon become an antislavery, and thus Republican, bastion, "Our principles have become aggressive, " trumpeted the paper's editor. "We no longer stand upon the defensive. We have crossed the Une, and are upon slaveholding ground." The boast crossed lines indeed, appearing to Missourians a taunt.^Â larmingly, Northerners and Middle Westerners-in lumping Missourians together witb the Soutb as a result of one lone, shared institution-ignored the "identity of interest, feeling and destiny" that Missourians hoped still prevailed over the Western states. Northerners who dishonored Southerners by proclaiming their institutions, and thus their society, as inferior also dishonored Missourians who shared Southerners' commitment to chattel slavery. Considering theirs the freest society in the world, because of both their Western, rural residence and their pervasive egalitarianism and commitment to liberty, Missourians opposed the Eree Soil arguments as slanderous attacks by an undemocratic host upon afree and loyal people. Listening to the widespread vituperation against the South and themselves, many Missourians at last began to consider their interests distinct from those of their Old-Northwestern neighbors and consistent with those of the beleaguered, siaveholding South, Ironically, while white Missourians resisted Northern influences in their society, their construction of identity owed much to the unwelcome Yankee hri^s Against this backdrop. Congress in 1854 debated tbe Kansas-Nebraska bill, which effectively repealed the Missouri Compromise by allowing popular sovereignty mto the region long assumed as free from slavery. The bill triggered a congressional debate of a magnitude tbe nation had not seen since the fracas over Missouri's statehood. More important, the bill unleashed a sectional storm tbat would eclipse any controversy surrounding its passage. Wben Douglas forecast that "a hell of a storm" would attend his bill, be spoke strictly of the legislative fight. What he could not have foreseen was tbe bitter border war that would ensue in the Kansas Territory, revealing the impracticality of popular sovereignty. At the center of this national crisis, for a second time in a generation, lay Missouri.^» Missourians saw in the opening of Kansas several opportunities for progress. By allowing popular sovereignty to dictate the settlement of territories. Western agrarian settlers would fonvard their ideal of democratic promise and thus triumph over a distant, urban, industrial, and thoroughly inferior Northeast. One Missourian who homesteaded in eastern Kansas immediately afrer the territory's organization believed tbat proximity and concerted action would allow Westerners to stymie "the bosts of tbe Lazarroni from the Eastern States and Cities and paupers from Europe that will be thrown into this country,... a curse equalling, at least, in its pestiferous character, the plagues of Egypt, in being made the unwilling receptacle of the filth, scum and offscourings of the East and Europe." Moreover, the Kansas-Nebraska Act signified to residents that, though challenged and even blunted for a time, the practicability of democracy had reasserted itself in its purest form, outside the invasive influence of government, whether national or state. "Let neither Congress, nor state conventions," exulted John J. Lowry, "enact any arbitrary laws to regulate property, then will our political institutions smoothly progress, & then will soil & climate point out where the slave-holders ought to locate." In Kansas, democratic liberty would triumph over influence.^ft While residents of the Deep South attached symbolic political importance to winning Kansas, the matter carried far more immediate implications for Missourians because of their proximity to the storm's center. Indeed, Southern arguments that regarded the winning of Kansas as "a point of honor," a means of regaining parity in the Senate, or even a last, best hope for the spread of Soutbern culture and institutions in an expanding nation that had routinely constricted them both, overlooked a premise fiindamental to Missourians. Simply put, they saw Kansas as a gifr-to them. The term commonly used by Missourians wben debating Kansas-"the Goose question"-connoted the sense of largesse implicit in the Kansas issue, in this case the ultimate Christmas gifr, a goose plucked for the holiday repast. By virtue of the natural progress of American westward expansion, Missourians claimed a "tiatural right" to expand into the territory immediately west of them. Just as Virginians had settled Kentucky, North Carolinians had settled Tennessee, and tUinoisans and Obioans bad settled Iowa, Missourians would settle Kansas. As Wilbam B. Napton noted in 1850, in the midst of the debate over the Mexican Cession, "the natural order of events" would have brought slavebolding Southerners into that newly-acquired region had not Northem machinations interrupted the process by claiming California.^Ê ven more troublesome to Missourians was the notion that if Kansas should not become a slave state, Missouri would become tbe first and only slave state bordering a free state to its west, effectively sealing slavery from further ingress and changing forever the complexion of westward expansion. Napton certainly recognized the implications. "If we cannot carry slavery into Kansas," he reasoned, "it is quite obvious that we cannot succeed anywhere else. The result will be that no more slave states will be created. The majority of tbe North over tbe South will in a few years become overwhelming, in both houses of Congress. This majority can mould the Constitution to their own purposes. What will constitutional guarantees be worth under such circumstances?" This precedent threatened to be weighty, leading Missourians to conclude that Kansas, by mandate, was tbeirs to shape. Atchison declared to a Northerner who opposed slavery in Kansas "that I and my friends wish to make Kansas in all respects like Missouri. Our interests require it. Our peace through all time demands it, and we intend to leave nothing undone that will conduce to that end and can with honor be performed
We have all to lose in the contest; you and your friends have nothing at stake."^T he nearly itnmediate mobilization of emigrant aid companies in New England tbrew Missourians into a frenzy, in pari from the fear that the interlopers would entice their bondpeople to escape. Hundreds, even thousands, of these "Hessian band[s] of mercenaries... sent here as bired servants, to do tbe will of others" were poised "to poUljute our fair land, to dictate to us a government, to preach Abolitionism and dig underground Rail Roads," William Walker predicted. Indeed, even before Congress authorized settlement in Kansas, Claiborne F. Jackson wrote to Atchison that "I say let the Indians bave it [Nebraska l^reyer. They are better neighbors than the abolitionists, by a damned sight. If this is to become 'free-nigger' territory, Missouri must become so too, for we can bardly Keep our negroes here now. from western Missouri "to give a horse thief, robber, or homicide a fair trial, but to hang a negro thief or Aboütionist, without judge or jury."^"
While the prospect of abolitionists stealing slaves was bad enough, Missourians found far more detestable the well-publicized method by which the New Englanders organized their swarming. With a capitalization of five milhon dollars approved by the Massachusetts legislature, and plans for mills, a hotel, a newspaper, towns, and tens of thousands of subsidized settlers, the emigrant aid societies intended nothing resembling squatter sovereignty. Rather, they appeared intent upon replicating in the West the modernizing Northeast. Indeed, the Squatter Sovereign forecast Kansas's grim future if invading urban yankees gained sway. They would create, according to him, "sores in the body politic ,.. [with] great wealth gathering in the hands of the few, the toiling millions struggling for bread; the one class is corrupted by luxury, the other debased by destitution." Northern hirelings, pawns of Northern money, could never be free, independent men of the land and thus had no legitimate rights in the West^i Most ominous to Missourians, though, was the grim realization that their "vilest enemies" would now use the democratic process to usurp popular sovereignty as the Missourians understood it. As one Missouri Kansan predicted, "the Abolitionists will compass sea and land [,) heaven & hell to prevent the establishment of slavery in this Territory." Wliat Eli Thayer and Amos A. Lawrence, principals in the New England emigrarion, intended, indeed orchestrated, was an invasion, one initiated not so much to populate the region as to subvert the system on which they pinned their fiiture, as well as the nation's. In effect, just as Missourians breathed a sigh of relief that the Southern phalanx had at last dragooned Congress into making liberty and democracy once again consonant by means of popular sovereignty. NEW Englanders now threatened the vulnerable alloy. Industrial capitalism would now provide the edge over individualism; slavery would be its first casualty. To destroy slavery, not by competition but by the state-making process, free-labor Northerners would use two weapons against slaveholders: popular sovereignty (the democratic tool that Missourians believed would open the West to slavery) and state sovereignty {the slave states' Cerberus as a minority within the republic). Ironically, the New Englanders' strategy for Kansas had effectively boxed in the very slaveholders who championed the theoretical pragmatism of popular sovereignty in order to overturn the Missouri Compromise and open Kansas to settlement. Once events were underway, Missourians were forced to support the political orthodoxy of state sovereignty in order to guarantee the territory's ultimate statehood, despite knowing that Northern settlement might doom slavery in Kansas, Indeed, as Missourians saw it, the democratic process now threatened to consume the West's heart-liberty,-*Ĉ ornered and unable to oppose popuiar sovereignty or to trust the natural democratic order. Missourians lashed out luriously at theNewEngland interlopers. "Kansas meetings" held throughout the slate quickly led to the formation of "self-defensive societies" and. later, "blue lodges" and other secret societies which sought to prevent abolitionist emigrants from reaching Kansas. One historian has estimated that as many as ten thousand Missourians, including a thousand in Platte County alone, pledged allegiance to such organizations. William Walker wrote to David Rice Atchison fi-om the settlement at Wyandotte. Kansas, just across the Missouri River from Westport, soliciting aid from the other säave states, "A heavenly time we will have of it if they gain the ascendency here!" Walker exclaimed, "I tremble when I contemplate the threatening prospect. Our Southern friends must be up and stirring, Virginia. Tennessee and Kentucky ought to send her hardy sons out to claim their rights and maintain them too. Missouri, as far as she can. is doing nobly for a new State."^* Walker's plea did not go unheeded; Missourians and men from other slave states formed emigrant aid companies of their own. At Atchison's urging, thousands of Missourians crossed the Kansas border to claim exemptions or to vote iUegaüy in territorial elections. Newspapers sounded the proslavery caE, "We are in favor of making Kansas a 'Slave State' if it should require half of the citizens of Missouri, musket in hand, to emigrate there," declared the Liberty Democratic Platform, The editor of Howard County's Glasgow Weekly Times reminded residents in the summer of 1854 that "if Missourians desire Kansas to be slave territory, they must do something more than hold public meeting, and pass high-sounding resolves; they must be on the move, and that speedily." As the territorial elections approached tbe following spring, be employed a more urgent tone: "If we would protect our hearth-stones, and defend our most sacred principles, we must act promptly. Let no one hug any longer the defensive hope of security, for there is none; aheady the torch of desolation has been lighted, and is now in the hands of fanatics.,. [and] nothing but prompt and determined action on our part can avert a catastrophe Kansas should be a slave State, but it will take slavery votes to make it so There is no time for delay-and those who do not expect to go there at present, if at all should assist those who intend, and want to go this spring, in getting off lmmediately,"*'' Once the voting fraud in Kansas became known, eliciring widespread condemnations from Northerners, Missourians refused to disavow thetr obstructionism, whether illegal or violent. In fact, they justified it vigorously as a virtuous defense of liberty against the undemocraric New Englanders. One Linn County meeting claimed to "deeply regret the necessity for any acrion on our part against any considerable portion of the citizens of the United States; but such has been the course of the Abolitionists and Ereesoilers, that duty to ourselves and families and a love for the Union of States require it of us, at the present rime." A Boone County Democratic meeting justified the actions of the Missouri voters in Kansas, claiming they were merely "neutralizing said abolition efforts, and preventing the fraud attempted by the importation of hireling voters into that territory," Similarly, a meering held in Fayette offered eighteen resolutions, the second of which "heartily approve[d] the action of our friends who met in Kansas, and defeated the machinations of the enemies of the Union and equal rights, the "aid society' emissaries, thereby maintaining the principles of the constitution and the Kansas bill, by which that Territory is recognized as common property open to settlement by citizens of all the States."^T he resolution offers a revealing insight into what had dearly become these Missourians' sectionalized construction of democracy, a crucial component in their adoption of a Southern idenrity. Though admitring that the territories, including Kansas, were open to the settlement of all, not all were indeed welcome. Only those who advocated extending slavery into the West would be aUowed to settle in the region. Such a conception now transcended old sectional lines to embrace only those who understood the democraric process, those not bastardized by the corruptive influences of industrialization. "Companies coming from slave States," wrote John H, Stringfellow in Squatter Sovereign, "will be heartily welcomed by our citizens, as well as those from free States who are aU 'right on the goose,"' "The 'emigration Aid society,"' Stringfellow warned, "who come without means and with Utopian anticipations and are sadly disappointed and curse the men who sent them hither." Only Westerners and Southerners, the agrarian backbone of the nation, would gain free access to the fruits of Kansas; their beliefs on slavery would be the litmus,^D efenders of liberty in Missouri targeted New England abolitionists, debauchers of the democratic process, and not Eree Soil Westerners, procreators of this greatest and yet most vulnerable of American systems. Drawing great distinction between free state emigrants, StringfeUow charged, "We are not contending against the honest, but mistaken Eree Soiler, but with thescutn andfilth of the Northern cities: Î4, Democratic Platform. June 17,1854 , quoted [n Shoemaker, "Missouri's Proslavery Fight for Kansas, 1854 -1855 ," part 1,23Î-34: Glasgow Weeldy Times, June 14. Oct. 19,1854 , Mar, 15,1855 : Monaghan, Civil War on the Western Border, 19-10,147, Î5. Glasgow Weekly Times, June iB, June 14. i3s5. j6. Squatter Sovereign, Feb, 20, May 29,1855 Cecil-Fronsman, "'Death to All Yankeesand Traitors in Kansas,'" 25-29, sent here as hired servants, to do the will of others; not to give their own free suffrage." "No one can fail to distinguish between an bonest, bona fide emigration, prompted by choice or necessity," he snarled, "and an organized colonization with offensive purpose upon the institutions of the country proposed to he settled." "There will be many a good citizen settle among us from Illinois, Indiania], and Ohio," Stringfellow advised, "whose notions of slavery are parallel with our own." Westerners, tbe virtuous majority, would save democracy from the hands of a conspiratorial, corrupted minority. Kansas offered their best hope.'& Once the bloodshed in Kansas brought ill repute to Missourians, Northerners condemned them not just as slavebolding sinners, but as frontier savages, barbaric bullies and uneducated "pukes." The caning of Massachusetts senator Charles Sumner in defense of free-state Kansas only confirmed the notions of most Northerners that Missourians were indeed Southerners. The event entwined in public perception the slaveholding perpetrators of the Kansas and Sumner crimes. Condemned as violent Southerners, many Missourians during the Kansas conflict internalized the characterization in a fuller political sense. They looked beyond New Englanders or Northerners as the enemy of liberty and democracy in the West and toward the Federal government. An angry group of more than two hundred slaveholders from twenty-six counties assembled in Lexington in July 1855 to condemn abolitionism, but their rhetoric pledged them to a conflict that transcended the current one in Kansas. Calling slavery a "God-given ... Natural right," James Shannon, president of the convention and of the state university at Columbia, argued that neither individuals nor governments could interfere. "Let us hope for the best, and prepare for the worst;" Shannon exhorted the audience, "and then having done all that men can do to save the Utiion, if a dissolution is forced upon us by domestic traitors... then I. for one say... having exhausted the argument, ive will stand As the struggle for Kansas revealed painfully to Missourians, the promise of democracy would not be realized in the West. Constant exertions, including armed forays into Kansas, continued interference with territorial elections, and recurrent violence in the hopes of intimidating abolitionist residents, did not stem what became a flood-tide of antislavery migration. Yet this influx came not from New England, but from the Western states, the same pragmatic people that Missourians had predicted would support slavery in Kansas. These free-staters, well outnumbering proslaver)' settlers in Kansas, waged their own war with the proslavery element in the territor)', repudiating the legislature and ultimately forcing a congressional showdown when Kansas applied for statehood in 1857. By the time the territorial legislature proffered its ill-fated Lecompton Constitution to Congress for approval-with its infamous Option to vote "for the Constitution with slavery, or for the Constitution without slavery"-even Missourians grudgingly conceded that the proslaver)'clauses in the document no longer reflected the constituency of Kansas and condemned the document as undemocratic. "All this is... the work of a few political demagogues," declared the Jefferson Inquirer, "who are seeking to bring about a dissolution of the Union, and are recldess of the means to which they resort to accomplish their purpose." Eor tbe sake of the Union, Missourians accepted, however bitterly, Kansas's destiny as afree state.^s More lasting than their dashed hopes for Kansas was these Missourians' newfound identity. The Kansas conflict completed the process through which Missourians moved far beyond mere sympathy for the South and advocacy of Southern rights; they had adopted the cant of Southernness. Prior to the 1840s, little evidence exists of Missourians having applied the term to themselves, in large part because the nation itself had not yet fully sectionalized so as to create the region in national consciousness. The term "Southem," as Missourians employed it initiaUy, was a metaphor for slaveholder, regardless of the individual's political stance on slavery's extension. In 1844 the Kentucky-born Tbomas Hart Benton responded defiantly to bis free state antagonists by affirming that "I am Southem by birth; Southern in my affections, interest, and connections.... I am a slaveholder, and shall take the fate of other slaveholders in every aggression upon that species of property." Similarly, Free Soiler FrankBlair, also a native Kentuckian and slaveholder, proclaimed that "1 am a southern man by birth, and identified with southern institutions by my interest and education."''"
By the time of tbe debates over Texas, however, with the cant of abolitionism well amplified, Missourians took up the cognomen of Southerners more widely, yet still largely as a defense of the peculiar institution. Prior to the Kansas conflagration. Missourians generafly claimed Southernness only when in the company of either those from the free states {who had so labeled Missourians solely as a result of their slaveholding adherence) or Northern-born Free Soilers. While Atchison proclaimed his Southernness defiantly in the presence of Northem colleagues in general, he limited usage of the term in the company of fellow proslavery Missourians. To the Democrats of Livingston County he offered his take on the recent Compromise of 1850: "Although in my opinion the slave States did not get equal and exact justice, yet we escaped dishonor and degradation. Let us hold our northern brethren to a strict observance of all the terms of settlement; they must comply with their part of the bargain." To another group, he affirmed that "as a Senator from Missouri, and as a citizen of the Slave States, it is my duty to resist every attempt to change her institutions, and every assault upon her rights." Atchison's deliberately selective use of language suggests that adherence to slavery did not yet warrant any exclusive Southern identity, at least not to others of the 17&2-1SS& (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), 27(1; Jefferson Inquirer. Feb. 12,1853 same stripe. The employment of the terms "Southern" or "Southerner" by Missourians was reserved exclusively for the benefit of outsiders, those who now posed a threat to the institution.« Though even the most ardent of Missouri's proslavery adherents refrainedfrom using these terms with one another. Southern identity as ligature of the slaveholding imperative gained ascendance in much of the state. One observer offered a sectionalized geography primer on the influence which proslavery and emigration now had in the state's politics, one that anticipated its new Southernness:
The y the time of the Kansas furor, those who evinced anything short of wholesale support for slavery and its extension to the Western territories were subject to bitter political attack. Congressman James J. Lindley addressed the U.S. House in 1856 claiming that Missouri's proslavery Democrats "assume to have taken into special custody the slave interest of Missouri, and freely denounce as Republicans and Abolitionists men of Southern education, slaveholders, and all others who do not conform to and maintain every arbitrary tenet which they set up;... I am charged by the orators & presses of the anti-Benton faction in Missouri as a Free Soiler-I who have been raised and educated to believe in the propriety of Southern institutions, and who have never uttered one word against slavery, either as it exists or in the abstract."" Missourians born in nonslaveholding states proved especially vuhierable to questions about their afiiliation. B. Gratz Brown captured this distinction most completely when responding to New York-bom state senator Robert M. Stewart's attack on Benton as an abolitionist. Brown-a Kentuckian-used the fact of Stewart's Northern birth to throw doubt on his proslavery stance. Unlike Stewart, Brown argued, "1 am a Soutbern man, in feeling and in principle,. , . the place of my birth forbids the ridicuious nonsense of abohtionism!" Frank Blair noted that "the absconding aboÜtionists fi-om tbe north, who. in my county at least, are the principle leaders of the Anti-Ben ton party, find it necessary to turn pro-slavery nullifiers to free themselves fi-om the suspicion which attends their place of birth." Blair then added smugly: "I can well afford to entertain the opinions of Washington and Jefferson, upon the subject of slavery, and to express them without incurring the suspicion of disloyalty to the bistitutions of the south,"''B oth Brown and Blair were wrong about their immunity from suspicion attendant with their place of birth. Perhaps more than residents of any other state. Missourians of the late 1850s drew the sharpest distinction between their neighbors not based upon sectional identity, but upon their adherence or opposition to slavery. Mindful of tbeir shared borders with two tree states, one running north and south and the other east and west,-these Missourians felt they could not riskgranting exemptions to anyone, even natives of slaveholding states. Atchison articulated the new Southernness, a hostility against all but those who supported slavery, whether within or without the state's borders. "Put confidence in no man for any station of public trust," he cautioned a group of supporters, "who is not known to be true to tbe institutions of the State and the rights of our citizens." Indeed, with grim kony William B, Napton delimited Ehe new Southern identity swirling about the once-Western state, "A man's opinions are not to be determined by the place of his birth," he observed: "Because a man is born and raised in a slave state does not prevent him from being a Free Soiler or an abolitionist-Kentucky is a slave state, yet I wiU venture that one half of the Kentuckians who emigrate here are Free Soilers-one fourth out-and-out abolitionists. They are not slave holders though born and raised in a slave state, and wherever they are they still entertain anti-slavery sentiments.... The political adjuncts of tbe nortbern Free Soilers stay scattered here and there tbrougbout tbe South and "bom and raised" in slave states are the most dangerous of the whole tribe."''T be democratic process bad robbed Missouri of its own progeny. With Kansas lost and their state isolated by i860, Missourians sought redemption in their newfound political identity as Southerners, outsiders in a West that the Yankee government had spoiled-but not before one final act of retribution. In tbe fall of i860, nearly sbt hundred St. Louis volunteers again marched grimly to the Kansas "Ttie Crime against Missouri" 8l border in a "Southwest Expedition," to campaign against the hated "Jayhawkers" who now occupied Eden, A month earlier, they had elected as governor Claiborne E Jackson, the ardent anti-Free Soiler, who articulated for Missourians the matured vision of their imagined community within the South:
The destiny of the slave-holding States of this Union is one and the same. So long as a State continues to maintain slavery within her limits, it is impossible to separate her fate from that of her sister States who have the same social organization
The identity, rather than the similarity, of their domestic institutions; their political principles and party usages; their common origins, pursuits, tastes, manners, and customs; their territorial contiguity and commercial relations^-all contribute to bind them together in one sisterhood Whatever may have been our prior differences, it seems to me, that the rime has come when aU true Southern men should be united as a band of brothers against the common enemy^F or many of Missouri's residents, the events in Kansas pointed out clearly that common enemy, A new alliance had emerged, one uniting the Northern and Northwestem states in their conspiracy against slavery. No longer was the West a place of liberty; the democratic process that had once buttressed Missourians' belief in Westem independence now threatened the institution that to them embodied those liberties, and not only in the territories, but in the existing states as well. Angry and disillusioned, many Missourians would soon question and even withdraw their loyalty to the Eederal government and the Union itself. These former Westerners turned to the region that now embodied their sense of betrayal-the beleaguered South-for mere than comfort. Indeed, William E. Switzler, editor of Columbia's Missouri Statesman, summarized his state's neivfound Southernness succinctly: "Of the South," he declared, "we arejór the South." Ironically, while the identity of the South as a whole, in CVannWoodward'stime-honored argument, stemmeddirectly from historical events (in this casea post-Civil War experience of "frustration, feilure, and defeat"), Missouri's prewar experience suggests that scholars must reassess Woodward's interpretation in that the timing of this process was driven in part by local circumstance. If events in Kansas provoked a reaction from the South as a whole, they most profoundly affected the evolving Southerners closest to the fray. By 1861, its rehearsal nearly complete, Missouri's Southern identity was already weU scripted,**
